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    08/21/20New boards added: /vrpg/, /vmg/, /vst/ and /vm/
    05/04/17New trial board added: /bant/ - International/Random
    10/04/16New board for 4chan Pass users: /vip/ - Very Important Posts
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    File: M3 75mm.jpg (101 KB, 991x480)
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    >infantry divisions get equipped with 75mm-armed half-track TDs
    >soldiers love them, even when the are no tanks to hunt, because the gun is extremely effective against fortifications
    >gets replaced with pack howitzers because troops dont need mechanized support
    >soldiers hate them because they are more vulnerable and less mobile than a gun-carrier
    >separate tank battalions prove really popular but their main drawback is that they lacked training with infantry divisions (could be solved by making them organic units to divisions)
    why is the army allergic to giving infantry motorized guns despite every instance of them being used met with nothing but praise?
    >>
    Giving infantry a direct fire gun was the whole point of the Booker. Unfortunately, goy retards are unable to conceive that one of the defining features of IBCTs is that they dont have organic access to the strykers and M1s that they could "just use instead bro", so it got cut.
    >>
    >>65623473
    there seems to be a huge tension between "we want big guns" from the troops and "light infantry should be light' from the brass
    the cold war was when embedded armor was at its peak, with an infantry division had a full tank battalion and an accompanying mech infantry battalion inside them just to be sure that they were prepared for all comers
    >>
    >>65623473
    Booker would’ve required most of the same logistical train as an Abrams. They’d effectively end up with all the drawbacks of an armored unit but very few of the advantages.
    >>
    >>65623490
    >Booker would’ve required most of the same logistical train as an Abrams.
    you can carry two of them in the same space as one abrams, and the lighter weight of the vehicle means that division engineers can provide the necessary support

    the M1 abrams needed way more supply and replenishment on top of that, the MPF battalion could get by with divisional sustainment and the battalion sustainment company
    the M1 abrams needs dedicated engineering and sustainment at every single level of command from brigade all the way up to divisonal
    they are not comparable
    >>
    >>65623491
    >you can carry two for one abrams
    Well the Air Force would seem to disagree with that, and with no large airlifter currently in production that’s not changing anytime soon. It was a 40 ton vehicle that was going to absolutely explode in weight if it was going to be remotely survivable on a modern battlefield. APS integration and add on armor kits would’ve very quickly pushed it north of 45 tons, and that isn’t the sort of logistical burden you can just hand wave away. It was going to be a huge burden for very questionable capabilities.
    >>
    >>65623491
    >you can carry two of them in the same space as one abrams, and the lighter weight of the vehicle means that division engineers can provide the necessary support
    Why won't the US just copy t-90m. They are lighter tank and better in every metric compared to the booker.
    >>
    >>65623491
    >the lighter weight of the vehicle means that division engineers can provide the necessary support
    Anon, it's "lighter weight" compared to an Abrams but at 42 tons it's in the same ballpark as actual MBTs like the T-72. And that's excluding bolt on components that will inevitably be added at some point or another.
    >>
    >>65623512
    it would give infantry the exact capability they were asking for, a middle ground between waiting for artillery and trying to assault enemy positions using carl gustafs
    thats a real capability that currently sits empty

    > and that isn’t the sort of logistical burden you can just hand wave away
    a C-17 is rated to carry 1 M1 abrams but can carry 2 M10s, because its both lighter and more compact
    and even if we humor your argument that APS would limit its mobility, then you still get 1 M10 to 0 M1A2s in a C-17
    so thats still a good reason to use an M10 for an infantry division

    and as mentioned, the MPF battalion only needs its organic sustaintment company and can rely on the already existing divisional engineering for anything else
    the M1 abrams needs brigade, company, and divisional sustainment units all dedicated just for the M1
    so the MPF only needs to bring its own company, whereas the M1 abrams needs multiple units
    >>
    >>65623515
    the T-90M would not have passed the MPF program requirements anyways, so it would have been pointless
    >>
    >>65623519
    >the MPF battalion only needs its organic sustaintment company and can rely on the already existing divisional engineering for anything else
    In theory. Thinking that a 42 ton vehicle can simply "rely on already existing divisional engineering for everything else" when this isn't remotely true for any country fielding MBTs in this weight class is pure copium.
    >>
    >>65623521
    >In theory
    there is nothing to suggest that the sustainment company and the infantry division would have been insufficient for a battalion per division

    you are merely speculating
    >>
    >>65623527
    >you are merely speculating
    The program was axed. If speculation is your concern you don't get to claim that you know better than the people who axed it.
    >>
    >>65623519
    Boeing rates the C-17 for 164000lbs on their website. Air Force says up to 170k on theirs. In any event that means there is zero growth margin on a platform that was not survivable before it has the same air mobility restrictions as an Abrams. If you are going to build a light tank it needs to stay light, not 40+ tons and growing. Yoloing the logistical burden up the chain isn’t an idea that actually works either. Nobody is deploying with that amount of spare capacity
    >>
    >>65623529
    there was no speculation
    the MPF battalion organization was publicly available, 3 companies and a sustainment company and slotting in neatly into an infantry division
    airmobility was also known, 2 of them in the same space as an M1 abrams

    this was all known for sure and all indicated a significantly smaller footprint than an M1 abrams
    >>
    >>65623485
    >the cold war was when embedded armor was at its peak, with an infantry division had a full tank battalion and an accompanying mech infantry battalion inside them just to be sure that they were prepared for all comers
    Why did this change? Was there a draw back or did they just do it if for cost reasons
    >>
    >>65623533
    >the MPF battalion organization was publicly available
    How did Russian BTGs work out again? Oh wait, they didn't. Fairytale organizational structures will remain fantasies no matter how many times you draw them on a fancy chart.
    >this was all known for sure and all indicated a significantly smaller footprint than an M1 abrams
    It made sense in its original 32 ton specification, not the 42 ton behemoth that it eventually became and would inevitably exceed as time goes by.
    >>
    >>65623538
    >How did Russian BTGs work out again?
    russian BTG was organized exactly how it was on paper

    > not the 42 ton behemoth that it eventually became and would inevitably exceed as time goes by.
    its still lighter and more compact than an M1 abrams and would have done exactly what it was intended to, provide a lighter alternative to an M1 abrams using existing components
    >>
    >>65623536
    The Army lived in Germany then and could expect to fight there. They had all their stuff on hand. Now it has to plan around how it will get all its shit into whatever country they’re expected to fight in, and have to travel a lot lighter.
    >>
    >>65623541
    >russian BTG was organized exactly how it was on paper
    And they failed miserably because they lacked the required logistics support. Sounds familiar?
    >provide a lighter alternative to an M1 abrams using existing components
    > In 2023, MPF product manager LTC Peter George said that although the Ajax was the starting point for the GDLS MPF, the current chassis shares little in common with the Ajax and "it's difficult to see the similarities."
    So much for that.
    >>
    >>65623543
    >And they failed miserably because they lacked the required logistics support.
    they failed because they took too much battle damage and were re-organized back to divisions, since larger formations are more suited to protracted combat in ukraine
    logistical support by itself is a reductive argument at best

    the MPF battalion is already situated within a division, a unit size already suited for large-scale combat
    so that will not be the same issue
    >>
    >>65623545
    >logistical support by itself is a reductive argument at best
    The operation was doomed as early as the convoy to Kyiv even before the formations took any serious battle damage. It was too heavym a unit with too light of a logistical tail. BTGs lacking survivability was long known to US planners.
    >>
    >no one has tried to answer the OP
    so, who was right?

    should the US army have kept the 75mm half track or just slotted M4s into the infantry?
    or was the 105mm pack howitzer the right call?
    >>
    >>65623556
    If the infantry was expected to do nothing besides hold ground in largely static positions or slow pushes then pack howitzers aren't terrible. Other than that you'd always want something mobile if possible.
    >>
    >>65623467
    You already answered you question with the last greentext. Using tanks worked just fine.
    >>
    >>65623618
    they stopped using seperate tank battalions after world war 2
    they briefly brought back the regimental tank company for korea only to abandon it once again afterwards

    the US army was/is basically caught in a loop of giving infantry organic armor only to take it away
    >>
    >>65623467
    I would never judge the effectiveness of equipment based on its popularity
    >>
    >>65623515
    Lol no one is lining up for T-90s after their performance in Ukraine
    >>
    File: 1790130491271234m.jpg (80 KB, 837x1024)
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    I want to live in the timeline where halftracks are still viable vehicles
    >>
    On the Eastern Front, Germany also learned the hard way that direct fire-support vehicles require armor capable of more than just protection against shrapnel and small-arms fire.
    >>
    >>65623633
    That being said a T-90 without the exploding autoloader and modern (western) electronics would likely be more survivable and more capable than the Booker while weighing less, which is the whole problem with the Booker.
    >>
    >>65623630
    Effectiveness of equipment generally correlates to popularity when you're actively using it in a hot war with high attrition rates. Equipment isn't going to be popular if the operators die in droves.
    >>
    File: images 2.jpg (65 KB, 800x514)
    65 KB JPG
    >>65623648
    the german equivelant was this thing, alongside the supersized 150mm version

    you will notice that neither of them have any protection other than a gun shield
    this puts them at roughly the same level as the M3 105mm that replaced the 75mm GMC
    they also have the exact same drawback that the 105mm howitzer has, which is that its not self propelled
    >>
    >>65623650
    Externalized (typically bustle) autoloading ammo storage adds significant weight to Soviet platforms on average. If you took any T-64/72/80 platform (and yes, the T-90 is just a T-72) and made them conform to those requirements and to also load NATO single piece 105mm or 120mm you'd see over 5 tons of weight increase.

    That's before the shitty ergos even get addressed and those will be at least another ton or more and even then you'll end up with "assault guns" that only take in 5'2-4" midgets of crews (turret crew would benefit from the autoloader change, driver is still screwed).

    And realistically it'd need to also need to migrate to a Western engine that has US Army familiarity. The costs of this hypothetical thing would be pretty expensive due to it being an re-engineered platform and it'd weigh a lot. Sure, you could shave some of the turret cheeks and hull front array but it becomes just a little more protected than the MPF candidates but also weighs more than them anyways. All while having shittier ergos, accommodating less crews, etc
    >>
    >>65623651
    Soldiers evaluate the individual weapon and how it makes them feel. Preference for expensive Thompsons over cheaper grease guns. Sandbags on tanks because it feels safer. Familiar weapons that have kept them alive over new and unfamiliar ones. The Sten was a piece of shit on the individual level but if was the right weapon at the time
    >>
    >>65623660
    Yes, but when you're talking about something like a self-propelled gun vs a pack howitzer, I'm pretty sure the crews know exactly what they're talking about.
    >>
    >>65623658
    >Externalized (typically bustle) autoloading ammo storage adds significant weight to Soviet platforms on average.
    The Booker doesn't have an autoloader at all, so you can cut that out entirely. That's a good amount of weight savings.
    > but it becomes just a little more protected than the MPF candidates but also weighs more than them anyways
    If you're going with a 120mm vs the Booker's 105 it's bringing more firepower and range to the table as well. To be clear, I'm not saying that the Soviet T-series tanks are good tanks. I'm just pointing out that when you're getting into the 40+ ton range there are options that give you more bang for the buck than the Booker. Something like the Japanese Type 10 is in the same ball park and much more capable.
    >>
    The army doesn't make procurement decisions based on what makes enlisted men happy.

    If that was the case, they would all be issued with Dodge Chargers with cases of Monsters and Zyns in the trunk.
    >>
    >>65623737
    KEK I can tell you probably worked in an Infantry unit.
    >>
    >>65623666
    >Cut the autoloader
    Your original platform's design form factor is not meant for a 4 man turret crew. The moment you move to a 4 man crew you need a bigger turret and any weight reduction you would have had would be gone. It'd also require a major redesign because, again, T-64/72/80 were not designed as 4 man tanks or tanks with an actual human loader. They're already pushing the turret ring diameter on the hull, you'd need to either deal with a taller turret in the first place because of having to put the gunner with the commander (even with the turret autoloader delete you don't get enough Z height) and redo the entire coupling. They were designed around their autoloaders for their small form factor and that's why they're lightweight.

    It turns out if you make it so the tank isn't viable for 70% of your service members you can make it small as fuck and in the process also save literal tons on armor. That and have thin ass side armor (no special packages, unlike on the Abrams starting with the OG M1).

    You'd better be served shilling a CV90105 or CV90120 at this point and it'd be as thinly armored as a Booker. Turns out reality is made of engineering compromises.

    >Type 10
    Look up the average height (and body mass) of a Japanese male versus a corn fed American.
    >>
    >>65623666
    >>65624405
    Also before I forget one of the reasons why modernized T-64/72/80s have adequate armor protection is from their heavy ERA packages, which precludes them from being used in close proximity to infantry unless you like fragging your friendly crunchies. Yeah, you "could" put something like low collateral, low fraticide ERA like BRAT or that one European system that uses composite flyer plates but you lose out on effectiveness vs KE and also a bit on CE.

    So you're back to basically a T-64/72/80's base armor plus light ERA in terms of protection. You could go "yeah replace it with Western arrays" and you could. You're still dealing with a 40+ ton tank that has plain steel sides on the turret (welded/cast) and hull. The only place you have NERA is in the cheeks and hull upper front. Meanwhile your mantlet is basically a bare steel trunion and a glaringly huge weak spot to basic bitch infantry AT, your LFP is a literal glass jaw of steel too.

    So you're back to being a Squat Booker+1 in terms of effective protection. Yeah, your front is armored but your flanks (and not even broadside, shit like 15-25 degrees axis) are glassy as fuck. You didn't get around physics.

    If you pour shitloads of money into the problem you get a Type 10 with the exquisite armor array it probably has but you still have the same problem as the Soviet lineage (with "minor" modifications): Manlet only crew. If you value weight above all else there's your exquisite solution. Highest end options to deal with armor, powerpack, autoloading but you make the internal volume small and have only ready ammo in the autoloader protected.

    So really if you want any more "optimal" of a FSV/assault gun you end up playing a game: Do you want it accommodate the 6'6" Irish telephone pole of a commander? Booker levels of weight and protection. Willing to tell everyone taller than 5'4" to break their spines inside the thing going cross country? Soviet levels of weight and (frontal only) protection
    >>
    >>65623658
    The ZTZ-88 and combat-proven M-55s both fit a NATO L7, decent FCS, and survivable ERA/NERA package into a T-series for less weight than the Booker. Like >>65623666, I don't think either is sufficient in the 2020s and that's bad company to be in for a $38m new tank.
    >>
    >>65623467
    didn't they make a different version later with the 105mm instead? halftrack designations confuse me.
    >>
    >>65624612
    That'd be the T19. Very short production run as it was rush-built to meet the urgent need for self-propelled howitzer ready in time for the Torch landings.
    >>
    >>65623467
    >infantry divisions get equipped with 75mm-armed half-track TDs
    >gets replaced with pack howitzers because troops dont need mechanized support
    The M3 GMCs got replaced by M10 GMCs. The infantry division's anti-tank assets you're talking about didn't belong to the infantry division, but to independent tank destroyer battalions that just got attached to them. If an infantry division had M3 GMCs working with the infantry, later they would have the M10s doing the same, to an obviously superior effect. Nothing was truly lost. Hell, this type of organization is more similar to how the Germans used their assault gun battalions: they were independent as well and all things considered this was probably more effective, since it doesn't require the same logistical footprint out of every infantry unit.

    Instead, the infantry had T30 and T19 Howitzer Motor Carriages in regimental cannon companies, which were the ones that got replaced with pack howitzers and then with 105mm M3 Howitzers. They were never as good at being true assault guns as the GMCs were.
    >>
    >>65624612
    Infantry had T19 and T30. Tank Destroyer battalions had M3 GMC.
    >>
    >>65624706
    infantry had the 75mm half-track equipped at their regimental cannon company
    so they did have organic TDs, in addition to attached ones
    they were replaced with the 105mm M3 pack howitzer
    >>
    File: 1776265493650153.png (568 KB, 1104x710)
    568 KB PNG
    >>65624754
    >infantry had the 75mm half-track equipped at their regimental cannon company
    The 75mm equipped half-tracks had pack howitzers on them, at least on paper, and were pretty much unsuitable for anti-tank work. Only relatively anemic HEAT shells and no AP shells, or even a long barrel capable of tossing them fast enough to penetrate any real armor.
    Technically, apparently, some units did go into combat with M3 GMCs in their cannon companies due to the T30s being put into production too recently to arm all units with them or some other reason like that.
    >>
    Most important thing in war is to prevent the infantry from wasting even more ammo than usual.
    >>
    >>65624803
    Why do American generals think like this anyway?
    >best logistics of the world by far
    >more afraid of wasting ammo than armies supplied by horse and hand-drawn carts
    >>
    >>65624734
    >howitzer/field gun/mortar/cannon shenanigans
    ahh fuck not this again, i hate remembering this shit
    >>
    >>65624826
    >why do countries that suck at logistics not care about wasting resources
    Bit of a chicken or the egg question innit?
    >>
    Without restrictions, it would turn into something like the Vietnam War, where rounds of every caliber were fired into any patch of thicket that was spotted.
    >>
    >>65624826
    the origin of the "we cant give every solider this gun because it would waste too much ammo" was in the civil war, where plans for mass adoption of the spencer repeating rifle were rejected on those grounds
    so the spencer was mostly just a specialist weapon for cavalry men while troops used muzzle-loaders until the end of the war

    this had somewhat more basis than you would expect, since an entire wagon could only provide 1 hours worth of shooting for a unit equipped with spencers, multiply that by the fact that the union army had expanded several times past their original size and industry was slower to catch up
    blaming the issue on soldiers being too trigger happy was likely just a convenient excuse

    the ammo problem wasnt as big of an issue in WW2, they mass adopted the M1 garand after all
    but ordnance still had a stick up their ass due to the US actually being the last ones to enter war footing in WW2
    partially due to actually being the last ones to enter war mobilization, only really getting into it in the late 30s and was only capable of doing it so quickly due to their massive industrial base
    but also because they had the misfortune of ordnance being headed by the infamous leslie mcnair
    his philosophy was "battle need", which was to stick to tried and true methods and only institute change if there was a battle need for it

    >75mm is good enough, 76mm will just confuse supply lines
    >self-propelled guns are too tall, towed guns are easier to hide and cheaper to boot
    >tanks are expensive, we should only have 6 armored divisions (he was vetoed and the US operated 16)
    >is killed by friendly fire during operation cobra when a bomb falls on his car
    >coincidentally, operation cobra was the first use of the 76mm sherman, after he had the first 1000 withheld from day 1 of D-day on the grounds it was not needed
    >>
    >>65624924
    i am overselling his infamy, during WW2 he was most well known for his success in developing training programs that turned fresh farmboys into soldiers, since the US army training program was infamously bad at the start of the war and it was mcnair who implemented reforms that put them into the realm of competency

    but his post-war legacy is basically tied to his retrospective approach to upgunning tanks
    by waiting for a "battle need" for upgrades, then you are just reacting to the enemy and letting them stay ahead of the game
    so by the time the 76mm was made available in greater number as a result of the battle of the bulge, it was both not nearly as good as imagined (the panthers UFP was too sloped for it to handle) and too late (the battle of the bulge was the last concentrated use of armor, so the extra hole punching of the 76mm was no longer decisive)
    >>
    >>65623467
    Adding motorization increases skills needed for operators and significantly increases maintenance and logistics needs. It has been shown time and time again that organic addendums below the regimental level add more complexity and chaos than they are worth. As you say, when they saw no tanks they were used against forts and they rarely saw tanks. That means they were wasted.
    >>
    >>65624420
    Which is why the entire program was scrapped. The resulting product is a 40+ ton abomination that costs almost as much as an actual tank while providing less firepower and insufficient protection for today's threat environment. The original conception for a ~32 ton assault gun that potentially could be airdropped made sense. A 40+ ton vehicle (base configuration) that is a tank in everything but name does not. We literally had a thread on light tanks the other day.
    >>
    >>65624973
    airdroppability is irrelevant in its role, since its in an infantry division none of whom are going to be airdropped anywhere
    its a divisional asset, moving alongside all the other heavy equipment including the artillery, which is its role, direct fire artillery, it is not a light tank
    >>
    >>65624965
    >As you say, when they saw no tanks they were used against forts and they rarely saw tanks.
    that means that the infantry really, really wanted organic self-propelled artillery and were rather underwhelmed by the towed gun that replaced it
    so as far as the troops were concerned, motorization is a small price to pay for a mobile gun
    >>
    >>65624977
    >it is not a light tank
    You can spout that cope as much as you want, but it weighs as much as actual MBTs (manlet types, as you put it) and will no doubt be used in such a role if needs arise. If the problem is that you want to give infantry divisions a tank without calling it a tank, just fucking give them a tank and call it a day instead of making a half-baked platform to avoid that problem. If all you want is an HE lobber that's going to blow up when facing actual threats anyway you can cut the weight down.
    >>
    >>65624988
    its not cope, light tanks historical role in the US is as cavalry units
    they were airdroppable because they operated far ahead of the main force and were intended to operate straight of air strips

    but not even the current CFV, filling in the light tank role, has airdroppability in its mission profile
    and the M10 would never have been in a position where airdropping would be necessery because IBCTs arent airdropping anywhere and lack the speed to rush so far ahead that armor would need to go straight from airfield to front
    >>
    >>65624980
    Respectfully, the opinions of infantry don’t matter on a strategic level.
    >>
    >>65625006
    The 82nd was the first to receive them, followed by the 101st. It's a light tank in the same way the M27 IAR predictably turned out to be a rifle replacement.
    >>
    >>65625025
    >The 82nd was the first to receive them, followed by the 101st
    and the rest were going to infantry divisions that had no airborne capabilities whatsoever
    the airborne IBCTs were being re-organized for commonality with infantry divisons in any case, the MPFs were not the only non-airborne equipment they were getting, resulting in the airborne divisions having a lot of non-airborne assets that would only arrive after they had secured an airfield
    >>
    >>65625007
    surely, the people using the equipment would have at least some idea of what works best
    >>
    >>65625025
    brother they were going to be issued to IBCTs in the NG with no airborne capabilities
    >>
    this would have been the perfect replacement for simply bombarding enemy positions with HE
    >>
    >>65625034
    >>65625044
    The project has its roots as a request from the 82nd for a light tank, and the 82nd was coincidentally the first unit to receive it. The fact that it eventually became something entirely different and leadership had to cope and pretend that it was supposed to be something else is immaterial. There's no point talking about who it would have been issued to because the program was scrapped before those non-airborne units ever saw them.
    >>
    >>65625053
    the airborne were the first to receive them because they were the first to receive everything, including the stryker SHORAD
    the M10 was going to infantry who had 0 airdrop capability whatsoever and so airdrop functionality would be pointless because infantry arent moving so fast that you would literally need to airdrop their artillery right next to them
    >>
    >>65625060
    >the M10 was going to infantry who had 0 airdrop capability whatsoever
    And they wanted the M10 specifically? Bullshit. Let's not forget that the USAF later straight up rejected the idea of C-17s carrying 2 Bookers so even that advantage over just using an Abrams no longer exists. The Booker was a solution that didn't solve any problems.
    >>
    >>65625079
    the M10 bridges the gap between infantry storming positions with AT4s and waiting for artillery to hit their targets
    direct fire artillery has been something the army in general had been asking for for a while and hadnt had since the cold war
    >>
    >>65625087
    >direct fire artillery has been something the army in general had been asking for for a while and hadnt had since the cold war
    Direct fire artillery weighing as much as an MBT was absolutely not what the cold war planners had in mind.
    >>
    >>65625093
    the M1 abrams weights 30 tons more than the M10 and, importantly consumes far more fuel
    the M10 could easily slot into the infantry division without needing an additional ARV company and fuel company in divisional supply train whereas an M10 could
    >>
    >>65625107
    Which is exactly why future Abrams variants are aiming for lower weight and better fuel efficiency. In any case, you're talking about cold war planners. The M10 absolutely weighs as much as a cold war era MBT.
    >>
    >>65623473
    by this point infantry has LAWs, AT4s, Carl Gustavs, Jvelins and an ass load of air assets to use, which makes these types of vehicles largely unneeded compared to the way it was historically.
    >>
    >>65625205
    >by this point infantry has LAWs, AT4s, Carl Gustavs, Jvelins and an ass load of air assets to use,
    the CG has short range, LAWs and AT4s have even shorter range, air strikes are held outside the division

    the M10 is organic to the division and is attached to brigades, which gives them a more protected, longer range, and harder hitting alternative to trying to run up to enemy bunkers with a LAW while also being more reactive and with shorter response time than waiting for brigade or div artillery to fire on target
    >>
    halftracks need to make a comeback
    >>
    File: m113 ACAV driving.jpg (117 KB, 500x332)
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    >>65625218
    half-tracks were excellent in the days when driving a tank was closer to driving a 16-wheeler, but most troops would agree a roof, even a thin one, is better than nothing at all
    >>
    >>65625215
    >the CG has short range
    700m is not short range by infantry standards at all
    >the M10 is organic to the division and is attached to brigades, which gives them a more protected, longer range, and harder hitting alternative to trying to run up to enemy bunkers with a LAW while also being more reactive and with shorter response time than waiting for brigade or div artillery to fire on target
    yes we've all read the buzzword advertisements but if all you want is one fat specialized vehicle just to fling HE at range then a Humvee with a TOW already does this better and cheaper anyway.
    >>
    >>65625230
    >a Humvee with a TOW already does this better and cheaper anyway.
    it would need all-around 14.5mm protection for the artillery protection desired
    it would need tracks for the off-road performance desired
    it would need a cannon instead of, or in addition to, the TOW to have the ammo needed for prolonged operations
    the TOW is actually not-ideal for fire support due to the bulk and cost of each individual missile and is only pressed into that role due to the current lack of anything else to use in that role
    >>
    >>65625235
    >it would need all-around 14.5mm protection for the artillery protection desired
    why
    >it would need tracks for the off-road performance desired
    also why
    >it would need a cannon
    just because you demand a cannon because you want a cannon doesn't mean you get to discard viable and readily available alternatives that do the exact same thing.
    >the TOW is actually not-ideal for fire support
    neither is an extra good for nothing 40 ton tracked vehicle
    >>
    >>65625205
    >by this point infantry has LAWs, AT4s, Carl Gustavs, Jvelins
    all of which necessitate a dismount, meaning operational momentum is killed outright by every single entrenched position encountered
    >>
    >>65625252
    >killed outright by every single entrenched position encountered
    So after all that back and forth, what you want is a breakthrough vehicle. Oh wait, that's called a tank.
    >>
    >>65625298
    its not a breakthrough vehicle, its a supporting element
    a platoon is assigned to provide additional firepower to brigades

    it is not the spearhead of a push, its there to provide longer reach in a more protected package for the infantry
    infantry will inevitably reach a position where closing in with AT4s is too risky and the alternative is hoping brigade artillery isnt busy
    which is where an assault gun is useful, it isnt as easily stopped by machine guns or artillery fragments, can independently react to threats as they appear, and has more range than either an AT4 or carl gustav
    this is not a breakthrough vehicle but still represents an improvement in protection and firepower than using hand weapons
    >>
    >>65625305
    >it is not the spearhead of a push, its there to provide longer reach in a more protected package for the infantry
    If it's not a spearhead of a push then you don't need 14.5mm all round protection.
    >infantry will inevitably reach a position where closing in with AT4s is too risky and the alternative is hoping brigade artillery isnt busy
    No, the alternative is pulling out a bunch of FPVs from your backpack and letting the best gamer in your platoon fly them.
    >>
    >>65625310
    >If it's not a spearhead of a push then you don't need 14.5mm all round protection.
    anything on the front line is in range of artillery and enemy MGs

    >No, the alternative is pulling out a bunch of FPVs from your backpack and letting the best gamer in your platoon fly them.
    a platoon is only carrying a handful of FPVs at most and if a platoon is hiding in the back launching FPVs they arent actually advancing and taking positions
    having a brigade vehicle with a big gun provides more firepower than a handful of drones and doesnt need the operators to hang back
    and in any case, they dont serve the same role and dont exclude each other
    you arent taking out a buuilding by launching 2 FPVs at two windows and then marching 30 minutes to the front by which point the enemy has re-manned the positions
    you are going to keep pressure up on the building continuously with a vehicle already on site so the infantry can actually advance into the building without having to deal with machine guns in every window
    >>
    >>65625314
    >anything on the front line is in range of artillery and enemy MGs
    And in range of the whole arsenal of AT weapons that would light up the moment someone sees something vaguely resembling a tank but actually isn't.
    >a platoon is only carrying a handful of FPVs at most
    Sounds like you need an organic division-level asset that can easily transport more than a handful of FPVs to the front then.
    >you arent taking out a buuilding by launching 2 FPVs at two windows and then marching 30 minutes to the front by which point the enemy has re-manned the positions
    You're not going to find anyone dumb enough to re-man a position that only just got blown up by 2 FPVs 30 minutes ago. Even ziggers aren't that suicidal.
    >so the infantry can actually advance into the building without having to deal with machine guns in every window
    If you're sending light infantry into a location where you have machine guns sticking out of every window and nothing but a Booker for support, I feel sorry for the infantry.
    >>
    >>65625322
    >And in range of the whole arsenal of AT weapons that would light up the moment someone sees something vaguely resembling a tank but actually isn't.
    infantry under normal circumstances would need to either wait for artillery to be available or else attack the structure with AT4s and carl gustavs
    the former wastes time and the latter is the most dangerous thing you can do

    the M10 has more range and power than the latter and faster reaction than the former, that alone is worth it

    >Sounds like you need an organic division-level asset that can easily transport more than a handful of FPVs to the front then.
    if you are talking about brigade-level drone controllers, that falls into the same drawback as artillery
    you need to call it in and then wait for effect
    platoon-level drones are limited by what they can physically carry and that if they are operating them they are way out far behind and will not be able to follow up on their own attack

    the M10 is physically present alongside the infantry and so infantry can exploit its fire from the moment it shoots

    >If you're sending light infantry into a location where you have machine guns sticking out of every window and nothing but a Booker for support, I feel sorry for the infantry.
    there will eventually come a time when infantry have to displace an enemy from a strongpoint
    the only brigade level asset they have to knock it out is their hand weapons, which requires getting extremely close, exposing infantry to attack, and having barely a dozen shots per person or evne just 1 shot per person in the case of the AT4
    and artillery, which has lag between being called in and hitting and not always being available

    the M10 bridges this gap by being more survivable and longer range than the former and being able to react to threats more quickly than the latter
    >>
    >>65625324
    >the M10 has more range and power than the latter and faster reaction than the former, that alone is worth it
    Would infantry appreciate the presence of an M10? Obviously. Does it make sense to make a half-baked vehicle specifically for that purpose? Fuck no. And as I said, drones have bridged that gap.
    >if you are talking about brigade-level drone controllers, that falls into the same drawback as artillery
    No, I'm talking about a bunch of UGVs or heavy transport drones that can transport a bunch of extra FPVs to the front as needed. You were the one who brought up the issue of limited FPVs at the platoon level. As for the issue of response time for brigade-level drone support, it's much less of an issue as artillery as drones can loiter and can be sent ahead of infantry. The response time is just fine as seen in Ukraine.
    >there will eventually come a time when infantry have to displace an enemy from a strongpoint
    You either bypass the strongpoint or level the entire thing to the ground. If you absolutely need to send troops in, you send in mechanized infantry, not light infantry. I'll say it again, you're doing it wrong if you're sending insufficiently supported light infantry to displace an enemy from a strongpoint.
    >>
    >>65625047
    >M3 (M8) dimensions: 5.0m*2.3m*2.7m
    >JLTV dimensions: 6.2m*2.5m*2.6m
    Know what, I completely agree. A nimble MRAP-sized howitzer motor carrier that can be issued to each weapons company (or even platoon, in the grunts' dreams) is exactly what the Booker should've been. Patria NEMO or some other direct-fire M120 derivative as the armament perhaps, so it can be useful for the 95% of engagements in which direct anti-armor fire is unnecessary.
    >>
    >>65625330
    >You either bypass the strongpoint or level the entire thing to the ground
    bypassing is not always an option ,especially for ICBTs
    levelling the entire structure requires concentrated artillery fire which a brigade would be hardpressed to do with its battery, which will be taking tons of requests and will not always be available

    > If you absolutely need to send troops in, you send in mechanized infantry, not light infantry
    IBCTs simply do not have the luxury of ignoring every single target in their way and ABCTs are going to be concentrated at the primary axis of advance
    "waiting for the tanks" would be the absolute slowest way to clear the way forward because you would then have to wait for an ABCT to be made available and then physically make its way to your position and then take over the advance

    assaulting strong points is an inevitably and not one that an IBCT has the luxury of avoiding entirely or simply waiting in place for artillery to level, which would represent a defensive victory for the defenders because the successfully delayed the attackers without ever firing a shot

    so, again, infantry have only two options to deal with strongpoints
    get suicidally close with hand weapons or use artillery and hope that it isnt backlogged with requiests
    the M10 is a logical solution, since it can physically communicate with infantrymen to fire at priority targets as they appear or identify and destroy targets independently while also being far safer than having to fire AT4s at every target
    >>
    >>65625335
    >levelling the entire structure requires concentrated artillery fire which a brigade would be hardpressed to do with its battery, which will be taking tons of requests and will not always be available
    What do you think we're dealing with, the Maginot Line? The strongpoint should also be pre-softened with a good amount of precision air strikes before the infantry even gets close. You're speaking as if strongpoints of that level somehow appear out of thin air.
    >the M10 is a logical solution, since it can physically communicate with infantrymen to fire at priority targets as they appear or identify and destroy targets independently while also being far safer than having to fire AT4s at every target
    You keep pretending there's nothing between artillery and AT4s. Even in that hypothetical world, a "nimble MRAP-sized howitzer motor carrier" like the anon above described would be a far more practical choice, and you could probably even field 3-4 of them for the same cost and logistical footprint as a single Booker while bringing much more firepower to the table.
    >>
    >>65623467
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4d9qeb-ucc
    >>
    >>65625341
    >You're speaking as if strongpoints of that level somehow appear out of thin air.
    because facing them is an inevitability, bypassing or sieging them is a luxury

    >You keep pretending there's nothing between artillery and AT4s
    because that is the current case with an IBCT, as is they have one organic artillery battery and then div artillery above them
    anything other than that, they have to handle themselves with their hand weapons
    which is where the M10 was supposed to come in, bridging that gap with heavy firepower

    >a "nimble MRAP-sized howitzer motor carrier" like the anon above described would be a far more practical choice,
    which would then resemble the M10 in form and function, because of the protection and off-road requirements
    >>
    >>65625344
    >which would then resemble the M10 in form and function, because of the protection and off-road requirement
    Anon it's not even close. The M35 alone weighs 2900lb versus 318lb for the M121 carrier mortar system. That makes the turret proportionally heavier and the chassis balloons from there. Whereas a complete, autoloading NEMO is only 4200lb for the entire armored turret.
    >>
    >>65625344
    >because that is the current case with an IBCT
    why do you keep lying like that? you keep pretending that everything m10 does is vitally and unequivocally necessary and everything it doesn't isn't needed and doesn't exist.

    who in their right mind would be running such stubborn damage control for a failed 3rd wheel program that's more at home in the 1960s?
    >>
    File: 1775382343443303.png (2.57 MB, 2617x1542)
    2.57 MB PNG
    The fact is that the only other organic asset capable of providing rapid fire support like that for the light division would be the attack helicopters (on station), which isn't really a realistic prospect in most modern combat environments.
    FPV drones can't, in any way or form, match the amount of firepower needed to actually bring a building down on its occupants or to blast a wall to smithereens from a distance. They're primarily hand grenade / PG-7 levels of effectiveness. You need larger guns for the purpose, and if you're not going to do like the Soviets and attach proper MBTs into infantry units, the MPF project was your best shot.
    >>
    >>65625377
    there's been a solutions to blasting heavy fortifications for a while, and it's called M1156 PGK.

    shoehorning a large and heavy gun into this for such a narrow-minded purpose is ww2 era thinming.
    >>
    >>65625333
    Ive maintained from the start that the best option would be an MTV chassis with all its drive parts shared with MTV trucks it would be supporting, but with a centauro-shaped shell bolted to it. This way the only unique parts it has are related to the gun, with everything else fitting within the existing logistical footprint. The booker was okay though, desu all this pilpul over what would have been better is missing the forest for the trees; that there remains a gap in capability that will remain open in apparent perpetuity with the booker cancellation.
    >>
    >>65625383
    >30m CEP
    >10% risk estimate distance of 125 meters
    No I don't think that's it.
    >>
    >>65625387
    >30m CEP
    why are you citing program goals like you donn't know that it's achieved 10m CEP in practice, with 1 in 4 direct hits? can you be an even more disingenous slimy nigger?
    >>
    >>65625390
    With or without GPS jamming?
    Since we're talking about "in practice" and all.
    >>
    >>65625387
    >>10% risk estimate distance of 125 meters
    wasn't your entire point that infantry weapons are too short ranged so you need a big gun to fire from afar at buildings?
    >>
    >>65625395
    modern versions are resistant to GPS jamming so it doesn't matter, your delusional cherrypicking and deflections are meaningless and pathetic.
    >>
    >>65624980
    I want an 80 ton assault mech, doesn't mean it should be given to me.
    >>
    >>65625383
    Certainly, but they take time to setup up, during which time everyone else is eating shit; and presumably your hypothetical large building full of entrenched combatants have their own IDF capability on call. So yeah, its a workable solution in the same way that call the cops and wait is a solution to having a serial killer inside your house.
    >>
    >>65625333
    Won't we just get a robotic gun carriage that will take a fraction of the weight/space at some point?
    >>
    >>65625400
    >but they take time to setup up
    it takes less time to set up than to drive your tracked cuck shed and lay the gun on whatever you're aiming.
    >>
    >>65625396
    >your entire point
    I specifically went out of my way to not reply to anyone and you still assume I'm the same guy, damn you.
    Direct fire support is used at whatever range you have to. You might drive it up to their door and jam the barrel inside, or you might blast at them from 2km away from on top of a hill. Whatever's your need at the moment in relation to how big the crews' balls are.

    >>65625398
    >modern versions are resistant to GPS jamming
    The modern jammers are resistant towards GPS jamming bypassing so they still work to make it inaccurate. :^)
    >your delusional cherrypicking and deflections are meaningless and pathetic.
    So you've run out of arguments and feel upset because of it.

    Do you also, by the way, propose that the artillery battery fire PGK shells onto every single target that direct fire would otherwise be used on? Hundreds if not thousands of targets in a single AO?
    >>
    >>65625400
    So you just described a sort of strongpoint that you really shouldn't be sending light infantry against unless that unit is named Wagner and your name happens to be Prigozhin. A fucking M10 isn't doing jack shit there.
    >>
    >>65625405
    >I specifically went out of my way to not reply to anyone
    yes, you deliberately run away from any arguments you lose and just repeat your idiotic drivel again hoping nobody will notice how battered and full of shit you are.
    >>
    >>65625405
    >The modern jammers are resistant towards GPS jamming bypassing
    source: you ragged bottle-filled asshole
    >>
    >>65625407
    Take your meds so you'll calm down, schizo. Neuroleptics are good for you.
    >>
    >>65625411
    Oh look, it's the same source you provided, how nice of you to notice.
    >>
    >>65625405
    >Do you also, by the way, propose that the artillery battery fire PGK shells onto every single target that direct fire would otherwise be used on?
    first it is a super fortified building that manportable weapons cannot even scratch, now it is every single target because not using the M10 means direct fire ceases to exist.

    are you pretending to be retarded and arguing in bad faith for something you don't even believe in or are you really this delusional?
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